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1 Introduction
Putting to an end two decades of anti-market policies, in the mid-nineties a wave of reforms
swept across Least Developed Countries (LDCs), in particular sub-Saharan Africa. Those
reforms were intended, inter alia, to improve the efficiency of agricultural markets by elim-
inating failed marketing boards and to reduce the distortions affecting producer prices and
incentives. Ten years on, however, it is fair to say that those reforms (some of which remain
controversial; see e.g. Rodrik 1992, McMillan et al. 2002) have been slow to deliver the
expected boost to growth and poverty alleviation. The feeble response of poor farmers to
price signals is an old observation in development economics and has led to a debate on the
rationality of farmers (see de Janvry et al. 1991 for a summary). That debate is now largely
settled, if only by de Janvry et al.’s demonstration that a weak supply response to changes in
market prices is to be expected in the presence of quantity constraints or “missing markets”
in food or labour. Along similar lines, it has been recently argued that reforms affecting
market prices can have only indirect effects on poor farmers who live on subsistence farm-
ing, out of reach of markets and market reforms. Clearly, the retreat from markets of large
numbers of farmers was the old policies’ result; however, once those policies had sufficiently
damaged markets, the potential reach of reforms was reduced, making poverty persistent.
Interestingly, Brambilla and Porto (2005) have also shown that reforms can have non-
monotone effects with an early phase of market disruption (their case study concerned Zam-
bia’s cotton reform, which initially led to widespread moral hazard) followed by a reorgani-
zation along a different market structure. Transitory shocks of that sort can send farmers
momentarily into subsistence. With a combination of re-entry costs and other market fail-
ures such as the unavailability of credit, however, the retreat of farmers from the market may
become permanent, implying potentially large welfare costs. It is thus crucial to understand
how large these entry costs are and what individual characteristics they depend on.
A lot has already been said about entry costs in the theoretical IO literature. In his classic
work, Bain (1956) defined them as any cost advantage that incumbents hold over entrants,
even if recurring. Those could come from economies of scale, product differentiation, or
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capital requirements. Baumol et al. (1981) defined entry costs as “anything that requires an
expenditure by a new entrant into an industry, but that imposes no equivalent cost upon an
incumbent”, stressing the importance of sunk costs. The presence of sunk costs was later
on shown by Baldwin (1989), Baldwin et al. (1989) and Dixit (1989) to lead to hysteresis
in market structure and trade flows,1 something that is close to our earlier observation that
entry barriers into commercial farming lead to hysteresis in poverty.
If the conceptual issues are clear, the search for empirical evidence on the presence of
entry costs is still largely limited to high-tech sectors in industrial countries, where, accord-
ing to Geroski (1995) “econometric estimates of the height of entry barriers suggest that they
are high”. In the trade and development literature, the focus has been on the existence
of barriers to export. Using Columbian manufacturing census data, Roberts et al. (1997)
and Sanghamitra et al. (2001) found that sunk costs related to lack of exporting experi-
ence affected the aggregate export response, leading to hysteresis in trade flows. Sivadasan
(2003) tested how reducing entry barriers through measures like trade and FDI liberaliza-
tion would affect manufacturing productivitiy in India. Porto (2005) attacked the problem
from a slightly different angle, looking at how removing government-related barriers to ex-
port (transport costs, custom practices, bureaucracy, regulation and corruption) would affect
poverty in developing countries. He found those barriers to be a large 24.5% of the value of
goods shipped, their removal having a non-negligible effect on poverty.
The type of informal barriers considered by Porto is likely to be relevant for entry into
agricultural markets. Remoteness, whether resulting from geography or infrastructure decay,
is likely to be a substantial barrier to entry into commercial farming, as is the lack of credit
or intermediaries (sometimes from ethnic groups that were marginalized by nationalistic
policies). Individual characteristics such as education and farm size are also likely to matter.
The interaction between those factors and the presence of entry costs has however been
largely untouched. One of the few papers approaching our concerns, Barrett (1997), looked
into the effect of food marketing liberalization on trader entry in Madagascar. He showed
1See also Martin (2002) and Owen et al. (2002) for trade-related issues.
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that liberalization of agricultural products marketing induced entry in subgroups of the food
marketing channel, but not in groups where entry barriers were high. Vakis et al. (2003)
measured the transaction costs occurring when a farmer sells his crops on the market. They
showed that the level of transaction costs will determine which market (farmgate, local or
distant market) farmers enter.
The literature’s relative disregard of entry costs in and out of commercial agriculture is
understandable given that those costs can be expected to be small in magnitude, as poor
farmers are unlikely to switch altogether to sophisticated input-intensive farming. However
what matters is not the absolute magnitude of entry costs but their magnitude relative to the
income of subsistence farmers, in particular when credit markets are deficient so that sunk
costs must be self-financed. Moreover, populations on the fringe of markets are likely to be
vulnerable ones, and even well-wishing reforms can have the unwanted effect of destroying
fragile markets, as changes in relative prices can be too small to cover switching costs or
make intermediation profitable. When middlemen’s trucks no longer come, rural roads are
left to decay and entire regions can shrink into subsistence. A report by Oxfam (Oxfam-IDS
1999) argued that this is precisely what happened in Zambia after the maize reform (cited
in Winters 2000).
This paper is an attempt to bridge the literature’s gap. We propose a method to evaluate
entry costs based on a simple asset-return model of farm specialization, the gist of which is
as follows. Suppose that being in subsistence or in the market depends on a given household
characteristic z. High-z farmers are in the market whereas low-z are in subsistence, with
cutoff z+. Each sector of activity can be thought of as an asset whose dividend is the net
value of production (evaluated at market prices for subsistence farmers, leaving aside for the
moment the issues involved in that valuation). The asset’s price is the present discounted
value of future dividends and expected capital gains. If the market asset is worth more than
the subsistence one for some z < z+ (i.e. for a subsistence farmer), the difference provides
a lower bound on the market entry cost for that farmer. For the marginal (z+) farmer, it is
just equal to the entry cost.
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Empirically, our strategy consists of estimating a profit equation for each activity (“profit”
meaning the net value of production approximated using the data available in the household
survey) using a switching-regression technique. This gives us two expected profits for each
farmer i, conditional on i’s individual characteristics: one under the “subsistence” regime
and one under the “market” regime. For a subsistence farmer, the difference in predicted
profits between the market regime (where he is not) and the subsistence regime (where he is)
is the opportunity cost of not being in the market, which of course depends on his individual
characteristics. The present discounted value of this estimated stream of profit differentials
for the marginal farmer is then our estimated entry cost.
As the decision to be in the market or not is endogenous to the profit differential, endoge-
nous switching-regression methods must be used (Maddala and Nelson 1975). An additional
difficulty comes from the fact that there is no natural definition of “subsistence farming”,
as the proportion of farm output sold on the market is, in the data, a continuous variable.2
Rather than imposing an arbitrary cutoff in terms of proportion of output self-consumed,
we let the data determine the best way of splitting the sample using a two-step procedure
developed for switching-regression models with unknown switch point. Namely, in the first
step we obtain consistent estimates of all parameters for a given value of the unkown cutoff
by maximum likelihood, taking endogeneity into account; in the second step, we search for
the cutoff value that yields the maximum maximorum of the log-likelihood function.
The threshold obtained by this method turns out to be at zero. That is, the sample is split
between farmers who are completely cut from markets (about 10% of them) and farmers who
sell something. This accords with the intuitive idea that indivisibilities are involved (purchase
of capital equipment, availability of intermediaries, transport cost, etc.). Once those hurdles
are overcome, adjustment in terms of quantities sold is smoother. Estimated entry costs are
large relative to income —between 124 and 153 percent of a subsistence farm’s annual output
evaluated at market prices. Interestingly, however, the economic opportunity cost associated
2As defined by the Encyclopedia Britannica, “subsistence farming is a form of farming in which nearly all
of the crops or livestock raised are used to maintain the farmer and his family, leaving little, if any, surplus
for sale or trade.” However, most farmers sell some and keep some for home consumption.
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with this market failure (i.e. with the fact that subsistence farms with potentially higher
returns in the market do not move because of entry costs) adds up to a mere 0.46 percent
of GDP, the reason being very low productivity in both sectors. These results, however
preliminary, go in the general direction of the literature on trade and poverty, making it
difficult to believe that the trade reforms of the 1980s and 90s were the culprit for the slide
into subsistence and poverty of large numbers of sub-Saharan farmers.
2 Model
Suppose that farmers can decide whether to participate in the market or not; if not, their
farms are called “subsistence” ones. The numbers of farms in each sector are S and M
respectively, both functions of time (argument omitted). Time is continuous and the horizon
is infinite. Let Πj (j = S,M) be the instantaneous flow of return to farming in sector j;
in the subsistence sector, it is measured by valuing self-consumed crops at market prices.
Let also z be a time-invariant individual characteristic affecting profits (for now taken as a
scalar, although it will be multidimensional in the empirical part), so Πj = Πj(z). Note that
ΠM and ΠS are distinct functions, although mapping the same argument (z) into profits.
We will suppose that
∂ΠM
∂z
>
∂ΠS
∂z
∀z. (1)
This single-crossing condition will, in equilibrium, lead to partial sorting of farms between
subsistence and market as a function of z.
Farmers inM are periodically thrown into S by indiosyncratic events (say, the household
head falls sick) happening at a constant and exogenous hazard rate s. Once thrown back into
subsistence, farmers can either jump back to the market by incurring a sunk cost c (common
to all) or stay in subsistence. We assume for simplicity that there is no lag between the event
of being thrown into subsistence and the opportunity to get back to the market.
Given (1), the individual-characteristic variable z will sort farms in S between those that
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decide to move back into the market (high-z ones relative to the rest of the S sub-population)
and those that don’t (low-z ones). We will call z− the critical value of z that separates these
two sub-populations and z+ the highest value of z in S. Thus, we have in steady-state
three sub-populations: market farmers, subsistence farmers who are constrained to stay
there by the sunk cost needed to get out, and subsistence farmers who do better by staying
in subsistence. For the latter, sorting is completely voluntary and reflects comparative
advantage, as in Roy’s hunters vs. fishermen story (Roy 1951).
Let p be the proportion of farmers in S who would switch were it not for the switching
cost; p and the steady-state values of M and S are endogenous, reflecting differential rates
of return between market participation and subsistence farming (like in migration models
where migration is driven by earnings differentials) whereas s is exogenous.
Let N = M + S be the total number of farms, kept fixed throughout. Using hats to
denote proportional rates of changes (Ŝ = dS/S), the evolution of stock variables S and M
is determined by entry and exit rates and adding up:
Ŝ = sM − pS. (2)
In steady state, Sˆ = 0, so equation (2) becomes
M∗ =
pS∗
s
=
p
s
(N −M∗) (3)
or
M∗ =
(
p
s+ p
)
N. (4)
The stock of farms in subsistence is
S∗ =
(
s
s+ p
)
N
and the frequencies of each of the three subpopulations are respectively p/ (s+ p) for mar-
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ket farms (z > z+), sp/ (s+ p) for constrained subsistence farms (z− < z < z+) and
s (1− p) / (s+ p) for non-constrained ones (z < z−). Note that, in steady state, all farmers
with z− < z < z+ have already been thrown out of the market, so only high z remain there.
Let r be the interest rate.3 Let also VM and VS be value functions corresponding to the
present discounted value of future profit streams and capital gains in each sector, given an
infinite horizon. All value functions are evaluated at the system’s steady state. Farming
in sector j can be thought of as holding an asset whose price is determined by a standard
no-arbitrage condition. For a market farm,
rVM = ΠM (z)− sc. (5)
In (5), the first term on the RHS is a “dividend” term —the instantaneous flow of profits—
whereas the second one is an expected capital-loss term equal to the product of the re-entry
cost c by the exit’s hazard rate s. The simplicity of the capital-loss term is due to the
assumption of immediate re-entry. One could easily add a waiting time to the story, but the
end formula for the entry cost would be unchanged. For a subsistence farm, the expression
is even simpler:
rVS = ΠS (z) . (6)
Inequalities between these value functions determine three segments of the farm population.
For the lowest-z segment (z < z−),
VM < VS;
that is, sorting is voluntary. For the intermediate-z segment (z− < z < z+),
VM − c < VS < VM ;
that is, sorting is involuntary: farmers in that segment would rather be in the market
3With perfect credit markets, the interest rate used in the calculation of NPVs should be the economywide
interest rate. However, under credit constraints, it should be instead the shadow interest rate defined by the
opportunity cost of funds for farmers.
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(VS < VM) but can’t because of the entry cost (VM − c < VS). Finally, high-z farmers
voluntarily sort themselves in the market, because
VS < VM − c.
Observationally, farmers in the first and second segments are indistinguishable and are char-
acterized by the same expected return conditional on their individual characteristics, as the
function mapping characteristics into farming return depends only on the actual sector of ac-
tivity (market or subsistence). Therefore, in terms of the relationship between characteristics
and returns, there is only one switchpoint at z+.
For the marginal farm (z = z+),
VM(z)− c = VS(z).
Using (5) and (6), this gives immediately
c =
∆Π
r + s
(7)
where ∆Π = ΠM −ΠS. That is, the entry cost is equal to the net present value (discounted
at a rate reflecting both the cost of funds and the probability of having to re-incur it) of the
profit differential between the two sectors. This simple expression will guide our empirical
exploration.
3 Estimation
We now turn to an attempt at estimating c following the logic of expression (7). There are
two difficulties. First, as the model’s logic rests on a comparison of financial returns, we must
find a way of valuing the return to subsistence activity. We do so in the simplest possible way,
by using market prices to value output. However we do not have farm accounting data to
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assess profits as precisely as if we used corporate balance sheets. In principle, one would want
to measure profits as the difference between output value (actual sales plus self-consumed
output valued at producer prices) and intermediate consumption. However farmers typically
report their income with considerable error, and cost data is non-existent. We go round
these difficulties by taking consumption expenditures (reported much more accurately than
income in household surveys) net of other (non-agricultural) revenue.4
Second, farms must be classified as “subsistence” or “market” ones on the basis of a
reasonable criterion. The most natural one is the proportion of farm output that is sold vs.
self-consumed. However this settles only half the issue, because the cutoff must then be set
somewhere.5 We choose, as explained in section 3.2 below, to let the data generate the cutoff
value endogenously.
3.1 Data
The data is from Madagascar’s four household surveys (1993, 1997, 1999 and 2001), called in
French “Enqueˆte Permanente des Me´nages” (EPM). Each is made of a household survey per
se covering about 5’200 households on average and a “community questionnaire” collecting
data on villages. The EPM uses multi-stage sampling, splitting observations into strata and
clusters. Strata are identified by province (“Faritany”) and by urban vs. rural area; clusters
are identified by administrative units (“Fokontany”) randomly drawn in each stratum. The
sample in this paper includes 5’951 agricultural housholds. Although repeated, the EPM is
not a panel as only a small number of households were sampled repeatedly in 1997 and 1999.
Commune data (collected in 2001 and covering 1’385 communities at the level of admin-
istrative units above Fokontany) is from the commune census of Cornell University’s ILO
program. It includes, inter alia, data on the commune’s level of development, infrastructure
and aggregate agricultural production.
4We actually also estimated our model using the output value only, assuming zero cost (since the data
on costs is not available). The results we found are similar to the results we get with our measure of profits
(consumption expenditures-non-agricultural revenue).
5See Hotchkiss (1991) for a similar discussion of part-time vs. full-time work.
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Producer prices are taken from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), for all
years between 1991 and 2001. Prices are in current Malagasy francs (MGF). Climatic data
was taken on the one hand from the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of
Madagascar and on the other hand from a paper on climatic perturbations (Rambeloalijaona
& Randrianarivelo, 2003).
The first column of Table 16 shows descriptive statistics computed allowing for the sample
design (weights, strata and clusters7). The first striking feature of the data is agricultural
household’s extreme poverty.8 With a yearly income of US $566 for a family of five (implying
about 30 cents per day per person) the average Malagasy household lives well under the
international dollar-a-day poverty line.
The second is the degree of farm specialization. On average, a farm’s first crop accounts
for 80 percent of agricultural income, and about 70 percent of total income comes from crop
sales. With 7.5 percent of full income9 from livestock sales, the diversification of sources of
income is somewhat limited.
At about 1.6 hectares, the average Malagasy farm is very small, which means that all but
the simplest capital equipment is prohibitively costly to buy at the farm level, and hence
that labor productivity can only be very low.
Land ownership is widespread at about 80 percent of all land.10 Of that part of land
that is not owned, sharecropping accounts for 4% and tenancy for 3.6%. The interest in the
distinction between sharecropping and tenancy is that under the former, the farmer owes a
fixed percentage of the harvest to the landowner, which provides partial insurance through
risk-sharing between the farmer and landowner. Tenants, by contrast, must pay a fixed rent,
implying that they bear the entire burden of crop-variability risk. One may therefore expect
6The second and third columns will be commented on later.
7For more on that, see Deaton (1997).
8A thorough analysis of poverty trends in Madagascar can be found in Paternostro et al. (2001).
9By “full”income we mean that our measure of income includes the value of the total harvest (evaluated
at producer prices) and not only the value of what is sold in the market.
10The 15 percent of lands that are neither owned, nor in sharecropping, nor in tenancy are either lent to
the household without rent or given by the village to develop it.
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more risk-taking under sharecropping than under tenancy.11
Finally, if all crops, sold or self-consumed, are evaluated at producer prices, potatoes
and rice contribute respectively 55% and 26% of “full” agricultural revenue. In fact, only
26 percent of the potato harvest is marketed vs. about 60 percent for rice. In terms of cash
revenue, rice contributes about 36 percent of the total. Overall, about two thirds of farm
output evaluated at market prices is self-consumed.12
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the prices of Madagascar’s main crops over 1991-2001,
after normalization at 100 in 1991 to improve comparability. The figure shows high price
volatility. Cloves, vanilla and sugar cane, in particular, underwent large price swings (from
100 to over 650 for cloves, to slightly less than 800 for vanilla, with high variability in-
between, and to about 900 for cane sugar). Other prices are somewhat less volatile but
oscillate between index values 50 and 200. Notice that except for sugar cane, crop that
experienced high price volatility are long-term crops, that is, crops that need more than
three years to reach maturity.13 This high price variability over the sample period allows us
to simulate the long-run response of farmers to price changes on the basis of observed past
behavior.
3.2 Method
Following the logic of section 2, we assume that the function mapping individual charac-
teristics into the return from farming is sector-specific, i.e. is not the same for market vs.
subsistence farms. For instance, transportation costs, access to credit and inputs, or any
factors affecting the output’s quality are likely to matter more for commercial than for sub-
sistence agriculture.14 This calls for the use of a switching-regression framework. As per
the previous section’s model, however, we assume that rational farmers base their decision
11Sadoulet et al. (1993) discuss the efficiencies or inefficiencies of sharecropping contracts and show that
under extreme poverty or gift exchanges, contract are in fact efficient.
12This sticks to Barrett’s (1997) number, where he says that in the province of Antananarivo, only 25-30%
of agricultural production is marketed.
13See Table 3 for the classification of crops.
14For evidence on productivity differentials between subsistence farmers and market participants, see
Brambilla and Porto (2005).
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to “migrate” from subsistence to market on a comparison of returns, implying that the
switchpoint is endogenous.
Let Πji, j =M,S, be farmer i’s “profits” (precise variable definitions are discussed below)
in sector j, and let piji = lnΠji. Let Xi be a vector or individual characteristics affecting
profits in both sectors (in general, these RHS variables need not be the same in both regimes,
but here they are). The model is
piMi = X
′
iβM + uMi, (8)
piSi = X
′
iβS + uSi, (9)
I∗i = (piMi − piSi) δ + Ziγ − vi (10)
where uMi, uSi and vi are error terms. In (8)-(10), piMi, piSi and I
∗
i are latent (unobserved)
variables; the observed level of (log) profits is
pii =
 piMi if I∗i > 0piSi if I∗i ≤ 0.
The presence of piMi and piSi on the RHS of (10) is what makes the switching endogenous,
whereas the assumption that the entry cost is the same for all households ensures that (10)
holds, the entry cost being subsumed in the equation’s constant term.15 Substituting from
(8) and (9), we can write
I∗i = X
′
i (βM − βS) δ + Z ′iγ − εi
= W ′iα− εi (11)
where W ′i = [X
′
i, Z
′
i] , and
²i = (uSi − uMi) δ + vi.
15A variable entry cost cannot be identified out of cross-section data, although we provide in section 3.3.4
below a very tentative approach to understand how the entry cost might actually vary across households.
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Let Σ be the variance-covariance matrix of the error terms uSi, uMi, and εi, with the following
(standard) assumptions:
A1 σMS = 0;
A2 σjε 6= 0, j =M,S;
A3 σ2ε = 1.
A1 and A3 are identification assumptions discussed in Lee (1979), whereas A2 reflects the
switching decision’s endogeneity. Given these, we can write
Σ =

σ2M
0 σ2S
σM² σS² 1
 . (12)
Let f (pii |piMi, piSi, I∗i ) be the density function of pii conditional on piMi, piSi, and I∗i , f j (piji)
the density of piji conditional on regime j, and
qi =
 1 if I∗i > 00 otherwise.
Let also q∗i =prob(qi = 1) =prob(I
∗
i > 0) be the probability that observation i belongs to
regime M ; this probability is unkwnown because the cutoff that determines it is itself un-
known (a cutoff assigning 10% of the population to the M regime clearly would not give the
same probability as one assigning it 90% of the population). Following Hartley (1978), we
can write
f (pii |piMi, piSi, I∗i ) =
 fM (piMi) if I∗i > 0,fS (piSi) otherwise (13)
and
f (pii |piMi, piSi ) = q∗i fM (piMi) + (1− q∗i ) fS (piSi) . (14)
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Letting h (pii) stand for the mixture density on the RHS of (14), the likelihood function
corresponding to problem (8)-(10) is
L =
n∏
i=1
h (pii)
and consistent estimates of all parameters can, in principle, be obtained by
maxL ≡ ln (L) =
n∑
i=1
ln [h (pii)] . (15)
The difficulties involved in the application of MLE to (15) are discussed in Quandt and
Ramsey (1978) and in the comments published in the same issue of the JASA.16 Since then,
a number of multi-step procedures have been devised to find consistent estimates for the
model’s parameters, including the unknown cutoff (see e.g. Hansen 2000). We follow here a
procedure set up by Hotchkiss (1991) to deal with situations involving both selectivity and
an unknown cutoff.
In order to describe the procedure in some detail, we introduce some more notation. Let
φ and Φ denote respectively the density and CDF of the standard normal distribution. We
write the inverse Mills ratio as
ϕj (.) =
 φ(.)/Φ(.) j =M−φ(.)/ [1− Φ(.)] j = S,
with the minus sign in the bottom expression to facilitate the use of the regime index j later
on. For future use, let also ρj be the coefficient of correlation between uji and ²i, and
ηji =
W ′iα− ρj(piji −X ′iβj)/σj√
1− ρ2j
 , j =M,S. (16)
16Most of the issues are discussed in Maddala (1983).
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Lee (1979) showed that
E(u2Mi|I∗i > 0) = σ2M − σ2M²W ′iαϕM (W ′iα)
and
E(u2Si|I∗i ≤ 0) = σ2M − σ2S²W ′iαϕS (W ′iα) .
Thus, letting ξji and µji be error terms and using ϕji as shorthand for ϕj (W
′
iα), we can
write
piji = X
′
iβj − ϕji σj² + ξji, j =M,S (17)
and
u2ji = σ
2
j −W ′iαϕji σ2j² + µji, j =M,S. (18)
Using this, steps 1 and 2 of our procedure, which follow Lee (1979), provide consistent
estimates which we use as initial values for the ML estimation of step 3. From then on
we follow Hotchkiss’s procedure (Hotchkiss 1991), which consists of estimating the model’s
parameters by maximum likelihood for a given (endogenous) cutoff and then searching for
the cutoff yielding the maximum maximorum of the log-likelihood function, re-optimizing
all parameters at each step:17
Step 1 An initial (arbitrary) cutoff λ∗ is set in terms of the share of a farm’s output that
is sold on the market (an observable variable). Farms are sorted in either regime using this
cutoff and a probit is run on (11), yielding an estimate of α, α̂. Let ϕ̂ji = ϕj (W
′
i α̂) .
Step 2 Estimates ϕ̂ji from the first-stage probit are used in OLS regressions of (17), yielding
estimates β̂j and σ̂j². Plugging the former into (8)-(9) yields a vector of residuals ûji. Using
17Hansen (2000) proposes a somewhat similar method for situations without selectivity; however his first
step is a set of OLS regressions, each for a given threshold value, the second being the minimization of the
sum of squared residuals by choice of the threshold. Note that Hotchkiss’s procedure differs from an early
one proposed by Quandt (1958) and Silber (1974), in which the first step maximizes the likelihood function
and the second step searches for the best cutoff value holding all other parameters constant.
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û2ji, σ̂
2
j², α̂ and ϕ̂ji in lieu of u
2
ji, σ
2
j², α and ϕji respectively in an OLS regression of (18)
finally gives an estimate of σ2j .
Step 3 All parameters being consistently estimated, they are used as initial values for the
maximization of
ln L˜ =
n∑
i=1
{
qi
[
lnφ
(
piMi −X ′iβM
σM
)
− lnσM + lnΦ (ηMi)
]
+ (1− qi)
[
lnφ
(
piSi −X ′iβS
σS
)
− lnσS + ln [1− Φ(ηSi)]
]}
(19)
where ηji is defined in (16). With this method, every parameter of (8), (9) and (10) is
estimated consistently and asymptotically efficiently. The value of the maximum likelihood
is recorded.18
Step 4 The procedure starts again from Step 1 with a different value of λ∗ and is repeated
until the maximum-maximorum of the log-likelihood function is found.
Step 5 Finally, the entry cost faced by subsistence farmers willing to switch to the market
is estimated by
ĉ =
1
r + s
∆E
(
Πji
∣∣∣W˜ ′i )
=
1
r + s
{
exp
[
X˜ ′β̂M − σ̂M²ϕM(W˜ α̂)
]
− exp
[
X˜ ′β̂S + σ̂S²ϕS(W˜ α̂)
]}
(20)
where X˜ and W˜ are evaluated at the marginal farm (the one with the highest predicted
probability of being in the market while actually being in subsistence), all parameter esti-
mates are based on the “best” sample split, and suitable proxies (discussed below) are used
for the interest rate r and exit rate s.
18The maximization was performed in Stata (Lokshin and Sajaia 2004). Note that Lokshin and Sajaia’s
procedure allows for weights and clusters, but not for strata. However, as omitting strata generally biases
upward the estimated standard errors, this is working against us.
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 Endogenous classification of farms
The log likelihood was maximized at λ∗ = 0 (no market participation at all). This splits our
sample into 449 households in subsistence and 5502 on the market (equivalent to 0.3 and
3.8 million households respectively). For robustness, a bootstrap procedure was applied to
λ∗: 60 samples were drawn from the sample with replacement; for each of these samples,
the model was re-estimated and the value of λ∗ maximizing the log likelihood was retrieved.
The mean value of λ∗ over the bootstrap was 0.00256, with a standard error of 2.26E-04.
The corner solution (λ∗ = 0) therefore seems to be a good estimate of the true value of λ∗.
As a further check on how reasonable it is to set λ∗ at zero, the last two columns of
Table 1 report descriptive statistics conditional on sectoral sub-samples constructed using
this value. As for gender, the proportion of female household heads is 18% in subsistence vs.
14% in the market, consistent with the common observation that female-headed households
are also often poorer. Average age is slightly higher in subsistence, but education shows no
difference.
Cropland size is 64% smaller in subsistence than in the market, and a slightly lower pro-
portion (76% vs 80%) is owned. Access to credit is also lower (2.66% of farms in subsistence
vs. 4.26% in the market) although both proportions are extremely low, suggesting largely
inexistent rural credit markets. Counterintuitively, market farmers are more remote than
subsistence ones, but export crops are known to be grown in relatively isolated areas in
Madagascar (see Stifel et al., 2003).
In terms of “full income”, a market farm’s main crop accounts for about 56 percent of
the total. In terms of cash income, the proportion is 80%, the difference coming from the
large proportion that is self-consumed even by market farms (see supra). If market farms
seem more specialized in terms of cash crops than food ones, interestingly subsistence farms
are also heavily specialized with the first crop accounting for 70% of the total evaluated at
market prices (the top two crops account for a whopping 90% of the total). In other words,
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subsistence farmers mostly rely on two crops only.
The bottom of the table shows that whereas farmers on the market produce mainly
potatoes and rice, subsistence farmers mainly produce rice and cassava, which accords with
evidence that rice and cassava are Madagascar’s most important food crops.19
3.3.2 Profit equations, selection equation and entry costs
The first column in Table 4 shows results for the profit equation of market farms20, the
second for that of subsistence farms (recall that we are talking here of full income, including
self-consumption valued at producer prices), and the third for the selection equation, that
is, for equation (10). The dependent variable of the selection regression, “occupation”, is
equal to one for a market farm and zero otherwise.21
Interestingly, household characteristics have a significant effect on profits in both cases
(market and subsistence) but less on occupational choice. Unsurprisingly, the household
head’s schooling has a positive impact on profit in both cases. Age affects subsistence profits
along an inverted U-shape but does not affect market profits.
The presence or size of factors of production (cropland size, loan, inputs, fertilizer use
and steer) in general have a positive effect on market profits and on subsistence profits; as
for occupational choice, larger farms in terms of acreage have a higher probability of being
in the market. Ownership structure seems to affects profits only in the market sector, with
a positive effect of tenancy. Quite surprisingly, climatic variables only show clear effect on
the occupational choice.
Remoteness (national road, transport cost and remoteness index) has the overall expected
effect, as the presence of a national road in the village has a positive effect on market profits.
Moreover the remoteness index increases the probability of being on the market, as already
noted in our discussion of descriptive statistics.
19The main food crops of Madagascar are rice, maize, cassava, sweet potatoes and groundnuts and the
most important cash crops are coffee, vanilla, cloves, sugarcane, cotton and cocoa.
20The definition of the explanatory variables is in Table 2.
21For concern of identification of the model, the explanatory variables changes in past prices, number of
rich, number of poor, remoteness index and livestock are only included in equation (10).
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Finally and most interestingly, the evolution of prices as measured by our composite price
indices affects occupational choice in ways that accord with intuition.22 The more a farm’s
producer prices increased in the past, the greater its probability of being on the market.
Conversely, the greater the volatility of those prices, the smaller this probability.
In sum, household characteristics, production factors, community characteristics and,
most importantly, prices, generally affect profits and occupational choices in expected ways.
A last comment concerns the statistics indicated at the bottom of the table. Sigma1, and
Sigma2 are the square-roots of the variance of the residuals of equations (8) and (9) and rho1
and rho2 are the correlation coefficients.
23 Only rho1 (the correlation coefficient between
occupational choice and the market profit equation) is significant. Since it is positive, a
farmer on the market has higher profits than those of a “random” one.
Table 6 provides the mean conditional profits under the two regimes: E[piMi|I∗i ≤ 0],
E[piSi|I∗i ≤ 0], E[piMi|I∗i > 0] and E[piSi|I∗i > 0], for different values of λ∗. Subsistence
farmers’ average agricultural profits is 30% lower than the profit of market farmers. This
can be explained by higher productivity, access to better inputs, etc. Controlling for their
characteristics, the switch from subsistence to market participation could increase subsistence
farmers income by 36 percent. Similarly, those farmers out of subsistence could see their
income fall by half if they were to move into subsistence.
In order to compute the entry costs going along with a move from subsistence towards
the market (equation (7)), we must approximate r, the interest rate, and s, the probability
of exit from the market sector. To be as close as possible to reality, we proxy r with the
interest rate on microcredit. Yearly microcredit rates in Madagascar typically hover between
27% and 43%. An interest rate of 30% therefore seems to be a good approximation. As for
s, it was calculated using the survey’s two-year panel24 by calculating the proportion of 1997
22The price index and volatility were not included in the profit equations, since these variables reflect the
movement of past prices. It is difficult to imagine that past prices can affect present profits. For explanations
on the construction of the price index and price volatility variables, see appendix A.3.
23Since rho1 and rho2 are not equal to zero, it means that σ1² and σ2² cannot take the value zero. Recalling
the comment of page 5 on these two variables, this means that the switch is indeed endogenous.
24The data contain a panel over about 1000 households, surveyed in 1997 and 1999.
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market farms that switched to subsistence between 1997 and 1999. This proportion was
then adjusted to find a yearly percentage of farmers switching into subsistence. We find a
value of s of 4.08 percent. From equation (7), the entry cost was computed by dividing the
opportunity cost by the sum of r and s, that is, by 0.3408.
Using these, our estimate of the entry cost is 536’385 Malagasy francs i.e. 139% of
subsistence farmers agricultural profits. The lower bound for the entry cost estimated with
the 95% confidence interval is 481’496 Malagasy francs, or 124% of subsistence farmers’
profits. The upper-bound estimate amounts to 591’275 Malagasy francs, i.e. 153% of profits.
The annual economic opportunity cost of subsistence farming is obtained by taking the mean
of E[∆piji|Ii = 0] over subsistence households that are not moving to the market in each
year.25 The estimate of the opportunity cost is 167’800 Malagasy francs, or 43 percent of
profits. Dividing the annual opportunity cost by GDP and taking the weighted sum, we have
that moving all subsistence farmers into the market would add an annual 0.46 percent to
Madagascar’s GDP. Entry costs and the consequent subsistence of farmers can be very large
when measured at the level of the individual facing the cost. However, at the aggregate level,
the costs do not seem to be very large, echoing the literature on trade reform and adjustment
costs (see Matusz and Tarr, 1999).
3.3.3 Robustness
For robustness, Tables 5a-5c provide first-stage ML profit estimates for values of λ∗ set at
10, 20 and 30 percent respectively, allowing for some market sales by subsistence farmers.
Unsurprisingly, the larger is λ∗, the more different are the regression results. Few changes
are observed on the two profit equations, but results seem less robust for the occupational
choice equation. Note from Table 6 that, as we raise the value of λ∗, the entry cost associated
with subsistence farming declines.
Table 5d provides profit estimates for λ∗ = 0 but with a decomposition of price variables
into short-term crops and long-term crops, depending on the length of time it takes for them
25That way, we estimate accurately the opportunity cost, since we only take into account farmers that are
really facing the cost.
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to grow.26 While long term price index and volatility variables are significant, only the short
term volatility variable is significant. All other coefficients appear to be in line with those
reported in Table 4.
A last robustness check is provided in Table 5e. In order to test for production aggregation
problems, the switching regression model is estimated on a subsample composed of house-
holds producing mainly rice,27 Madagascar’s most common crop. With 84% of Malagasy
households producing rice as one of their first two crops, we have a large enough subsample
(4996 observations). Regression results on rice are shown in Table 5e. As there is little
change between whole-sample and rice-sample estimates, crop aggregation does not seem to
have a critical impact on our conclusions.
Table 6a provides the rice subsample’s conditional profits for different values of λ∗. It
shows that both subsistence and market profits are slightly higher in the subsample than in
the full sample. Rice thus seems to be more profitable than the “average” crop. The entry
cost’s upper- and lower-bound estimates are close to the full-sample ones.
3.3.4 Policy implications
As a market failure, the presence of barriers to entry into commercial farming obviously has
potential policy implications. However what corrective measures are appropriate depends on
the nature of the barriers. If they are private (say, the need to purchase capital equipment),
then one would presume that improved access to credit would be key to reducing them.
If, by contrast, they are collective (say, the quality of the local road infrastructure) then
government action is needed.
In order to shed —very preliminary— light on this question, we show in Table 7 the
results of a simple regression of ∆pi ≡ pˆiM − pˆiS, the (predicted) opportunity cost of sub-
sistence farming, on household characteristics. The idea of this regression is to identify
individual characteristics correlated with high opportunity costs and hence with large gains
26For the classification of the crops, see table 3.
27Since in most of the case, households have two important crops (e.g, she mainly produces vanilla for
exports, but also a large amount of rice for self consumption), we considered both of them as main crops.
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from switching to commercial farming. This exercise should be interpreted with caution,
however, if only because for all farmers other than the “marginal” one, the negative earning
differential measured by ∆pi (negative because the first term is hypothetical while the second
term is actual) is only a lower bound on the actual entry cost.
Large households seem to have higher opportunity costs, possibly reflecting the fact that
they have lower per-capita income and hence less surplus to purchase capital equipment to
switch to the market. Households with a more educated and younger head and a larger farm
have the lowest opportunity cost, suggesting, in accordance with intuition, that they are
more reactive to economic incentives.
The presence of a producer association widens the opportunity cost, suggesting that it
raises the return to commercial farming (possibly by improving the farmers’ bargaining power
vis-a`-vis middlemen) without making it easier for subsistence farmers to switch. Access
to credit also reduces negative earnings differentials, suggesting that credit does help to
overcome barriers to entry in the market. However as discussed elsewhere in this paper one
shouldn’t make too much of this given the very low proportion of farms with access to credit.
Finally, the presence of a national road in the village raises the opportunity cost of being in
subsistence, suggesting that it raises the return to commercial farming (as one would expect)
without helping subsistence farmers to do the switch. Taken together, the combination of
the effects of credit and transportation leans more in the direction of private than public
entry barriers.
4 Concluding remarks
As discussed in the introduction, so far empirical work on entry barriers has largely left
out agricultural markets. Yet, these markets are important in poor countries where trade-
adjustment assistance mechanisms can be expected to be weak; moreover, the extreme
poverty of rural households in least-developed countries like Madagascar makes them partic-
ularly vulnerable to even small deteriorations in their terms of trade. Recent work on trade
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and poverty has also highlighted the fact that agricultural markets themselves are fragile and
can be destroyed when institutions (like intermediation) or infrastructure (like rural roads)
are left to decay, which can happen when changes in relative prices are perceived to last.
Restoring those markets can be long and costly.
This suggests that rural households in the grey zone between market participation and
subsistence should receive particular attention in the design of reforms. Of course, the
incentives faced by those households can be assessed only indirectly using the household
surveys’ noisy information, and there is anyway no natural definition of subsistence farming.
Notwithstanding these difficulties —for which we have no perfect fix— our analysis yields a
number of results.
We define the cost of moving out of subsistence as the present discounted value of the
expected opportunity cost of not switching for the “marginal farmer” —the one whose fun-
damentals make him just indifferent between “going commercial” and not. We then approx-
imate this magnitude empirically by comparing the monetary equivalent of the return to
subsistence vs. commercial farming.
The most striking insight coming out of our empirical analysis is that the order of magni-
tude of this entry cost seems to be very large: more than one year of the typical subsistence
farmer’s output valued at market prices. Such a large entry barrier implies the persistence of
relatively large returns differentials between subsistence and market farming. It also makes
subsistence farming “sticky”, a sort of poverty trap.
Could our entry-cost calculation be biased upward? Because it is essentially an NPV
calculation, there are two possible sources of upward bias: either the profit differential ap-
pearing on the numerator (the opportunity cost from not being on the market) is too high,
or the interest and exit rates appearing in the denominator are too low. We use very high
microcredit rates as interest rates, so the interest rate is unlikely to be the problem. There is
more uncertainty about the accuracy of our exit rate, which was estimated on a short sample
period (1997-99) and may not be representative of long-run exit rates. We have, however,
no outside information to benchmark it and so no prior about whether it might be too high
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or too low. As for the denominator, by contrast, there may be an argument. Because we
value subsistence output at producer prices, it is indeed possible that we under-estimate the
return to subsistence farming. One might argue for using consumer prices to value output
that is for consumption; as consumer prices are above producer prices, this would raise the
“shadow” return to subsistence farming and hence reduce the profit differential (the oppor-
tunity cost from not being in the market) and the inferred entry cost. This should be kept
in mind as a caveat, but the difference between producer and consumer prices is unlikely to
change drastically the flavor of our result. Even cut in half, the entry cost would still be
several months’ worth of production.
Because Malagasy agriculture has a very low productivity, it turns out that the oppor-
tunity cost of subsistence farming (the income loss attributable to the failure of farmers to
switch to the market) is small relative to the overall economy (although the whole economy
is characterized by low productivity): moving all farmers out of subsistence would add a
meagre 0.46 percent to Madagascar’s GDP.
One important question for which we can provide only a very preliminary approach is
whether entry costs are private (say, the upfront purchase of capital) our collective (say, road
improvements). Both conjectures are consistent with the evidence we find of unused arbitrage
opportunities; yet, they would call for very different policy remedies. We tried to get a first
shot at this issue by exploring the correlation between negative earnings differentials and
individual characteristics, including access to credit and transport infrastructure. We take
the result that access to credit seems to reduce unused opportunities while road infrastructure
enlarges them as —very preliminary— evidence that entry barriers into commercial farming
seem to have to do with private rather than public goods, alhough further research is clearly
called for.
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A Construction of variables
The construction of the EPM variables was guided by Appendix 1 and 2 of a paper by
Paternostro et al (2001). In these appendix, the authors give a comprehensive description
of the EPM surveys of 1993, 1997 and 1999. Most of all, they point out the differences
appearing between them. Taking their comments into consideration, we built variables that
are as consistent as possible across surveys.
The description of how variables were created will be done only when the construction was
not straightforward and where questions might be raised.
A.1 Expenditures
The expenditures variable was constructed from the expenditure sections of the EPM. Fol-
lowing Paternostro et al (2001), we omitted items that did not appear in all surveys. In the
end, this variable is composed of every-day consumption (food, clothes, hobbies....), health
expenditures and schooling expenditures.
A.2 Autoconsumption
As it clearly appears in Paternostro et al, building a measure of autoconsumption raises
many problems. In this paper, autoconsumption is a key variable, since it is one of the
components of the household’s profit, which is the dependent variable of the model. For
that reason, we paid particular attention to the construction of this variable.
As for the previous variable, only goods that showed in all surveys were included in the
autoconsumption bundle. In addition, we limited our measure to autoconsumption of crops,
ignoring autoconsumption of livestock and other produce resulting from cattle breeding, of
product of fishing or hunting and of processed products.
Autoconsumption is evaluated at both retail price and producer price. It is the latter
that is used in the measure of profits, since autoconsumption is compared with sales, which
are logically valued at producer prices.
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Selling prices are relatively easy to get, since in each survey, farmers are asked how much
they sold of each crop and how much money they brought from it. It is then straightforward
to calculate unit producer prices for each crop in each farm. However, because of differ-
ences in quality of the farmers’ products28, producer prices are regressed on the household’s
characteristics. The fitted price obtained from this regression is free of quality differences.
Autoconsumption is then evaluated at this fitted farmgate price.
We apply the same method as Paternostro et al29 to compute the retail prices. Since
all surveys contain a detailed expenditure section, we could calculate purchase prices for
most of the crops. However, as Paternostro et al. explain in their paper, the prices we
could derive that way are rather suspect. To circumvent this problem, we make use of retail
prices found in the 1999 community questionnaire. These prices were directly noted down
from the displays by the survey investigator, in each community. Comparing these prices
with the 1999 selling prices, a markup is calculated. This markup is then applied to the
fitted producer prices in the four surveys. The hence calculated retail prices are then used
to evaluate autoconsumption.
A.3 Evolution of prices
We would expect that one of the most important decision variable is the changes in prices
of the crops the farmer grows. We therefore compute price indexes reflecting the general
change in prices of the farmer’s crops.
The evident pitfall of such an exercise is the determination of the period over which
the price indexes should be calculated. In order to be closer to reality, crops are split into
two groups depending on the time needed between the planting of the crop until the first
harvest. This can take from as little time as 3 months (rice for example) to as much as 8
years (cloves). Crops that need 1.5 year or less to reach maturity are classified as “short
28Difference in the prices of the same good sold by various farmers will partly be due to dissimilarities in
the quality of the goods.
29For details, see Paternostro et al (2001), p.79.
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term crops”. The rest is described as “long term crops”.30 The distinction between the two
groups is important with respect to the decision process of farmers. Undeniably, the impact
of a change in the price of a crop will be different whether the farmer faces a short term crop
or a long term crop. In the former case, a sudden fall in the price will prompt the farmer
to drop that crop for another, more profitable crop. In contrast, in the latter case, a sudden
diminution of the price will not have much impact on the farmer’s cropping decision. Indeed,
not only is the profitability of a long term crop determined over the several past years, but
also, the investment that growing such a crop represents will hinder the farmer from taking
any rushed decision.
With this in mind, a Tornqvist price index was computed, where long term crop price
changes were observed on 10 years and short term crop ones were taken on 3 years. In other
words, we took the average change in price over 10 years for the long term crops, when
possible31 and on 3 years for the short term crops. Tornqvist price index has therefore the
following form :
Tornqvisti =
L∏
l=1
(∆pil)
shareil
S∏
s=1
(∆pis)
shareis l, s ∈ {1, 4}, L+ S = 4, 32 (21)
where i stands for the household, l for long term crops, s for short term crops and
∆pil =
9∑
n=1
1
9
(
pl,n
pl,n−1
)
, (22)
∆pis =
2∑
n=1
1
2
(
pl,n
pl,n−1
)
, (23)
30See Table 3 for the classification of crops.
31As mentioned before, the FAO database contains producer prices from 1991 to 2001. The 1993 long
term price index was thus calculated over the period 1991-1993, whereas the 2001 index was computed over
the period 1991-2001. This divergence is certainly not desirable, but inescapable because of the limitation
of the data.
32The total of the long term and short term crops must equal four, since farmers can grow four crops at
most.
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where n stands for years, and
shareic =
valued harvestic
total valued harvesti
c ∈ [l, s]33 (24)
In order to control for the volatility of prices over the years, another Tornqvist index was
computed by taking the standard error of the price changes instead of the averages :
SETornqvisti =
L∏
l=1
(SE∆pil)
shareil
S∏
s=1
(SE∆pis)
shareis (25)
where SE∆pil is the standard error of the price changes of long term over the 10 years and
SE∆pis is the standard error of the price changes of short term over 3 years.
Finally, note that the Tornqvist price index is referred to as “Price index” in the regres-
sions and the volatility price index as “SE Price index”.
33The harvest of household i at time t (recall that each household is observed once only) is valued at the
prices of the different crops at time t.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Statistics Total Market Subsistence
Sample size 5951 5502 449
Family size
Mean 5.09 5.08 5.14
Std. Error 0.05 0.05 0.14
Household’s head, percentage by sexe
Male 85.60 85.88 81.86
Female 14.40 14.12 18.14
Household’s head age distribution (% population)
15-30 years 23.29 23.53 19.99
30-45 years 38.74 38.93 36.18
45-60 years 24.85 24.52 29.23
60 years and more 12.99 12.88 14.59
Household’s head highest level of education attained (% population)
Primary 84.73 84.69 85.21
Std. Error 0.6 0.6 1.8
Secondary 14.97 15.00 14.61
Std. Error 0.6 0.6 1.8
University 0.29 0.3 0.17
Std. Error 0.1 0.1 0.2
Cropland surface (ha)
Mean 1.61 1.65 1.06
Std. Error 0.05 0.06 0.07
Percentage of owned land
Mean 79.94 80.08 76.48
Std. Error 0.8 0.8 2.4
Percentage of land in sharecropping
Mean 4.06 3.96 5.47
Std. Error 0.3 0.3 1.12
Percentage of rented land
Mean 3.64 3.56 4.64
Std. Error 0.3 0.27 0.9
Percentage of households with outstanding agricultural loan
Mean 4.15 4.26 2.66
Std. Error 0.39 0.4 0.1
Remoteness (% population being)
Least remote 34.83 34.57 38.29
Std. Error 2.01 1.7 3.0
Fairly remote 43.19 43.02 45.41
Std. Error 2.33 1.9 3.2
Most remote 21.96 22.39 16.27
Std. Error 2.02 2.1 2.9
Annual expenditures (mean)
MGF 389230.82 397496.50 278969.91
Std. Error 9794.90 10224.74 12846.21
$, PPP 566.52 578.55 406.03
Std. Error 14.88 15.71 18.70
Annual profts (mean)
MGF 626374.10 639355.54 453208.10
Std. Error 13344.29 13728.22 27877.13
$, PPP 911.67 930.57 659.63
Std. Error 19.42 19.98 40.57
Share of income of livestock sales in full income (mean)
Mean 7.46 6.55 19.70
Std. Error 0.27 0.23 1.12
Share of crop sales in total income
Mean 71.0 76.30 0
Std. Error 0.8 0.63 0
Share of crop sales in crop harvest (in value)
Mean 38.05 40.90 0
Std. Error 0.67 0.6 0
Share of crop sale in total crop sales (mean)
Main crop 80.50 80.50 0
Std. Error 0.55 0.55 0
Second main crop 15.25 15.25 0
Std. Error 0.37 0.37 0
Third crop 3.46 3.46 0
Std. Error 0.18 0.18 0
Fourth crop 0.78 0.78 0
Std. Error 0.06 0.06 0
Share of crop harvest in harvest of all crops (mean)
Main crop 56.54 55.58 69.28
Std. Error 0.77 0.8 1.6
Second main crop 24.09 24.37 20.47
Std. Error 0.45 0.5 1.0
Third crop 13.56 13.99 7.76
Std. Error 0.39 0.4 0.8
Fourth crop 5.81 6.06 2.49
Std. Error 0.27 0.3 0.3
Most cultivated crops
(share of crop’s total harvest in population total harvest) Potato 55.22 Potato 57.18 Rice 68.76
Rice 25.84 Rice 24.87 Yam 16.39
Cassava 6.47 Cassava 6.09 Sweet potato 9.55
Coffee 2.65 Coffee 2.65 Maize 5.16
Maize 1.78 Maize 1.66 Coffee 4.04
Most cultivated crops in value
(% crop’s population total sales in population total sales) Rice 36.39 Rice 36.39 -
Coffee 11.49 Coffee 11.49 -
Vanilla 10.56 Vanilla 10.56 -
Cassava 7.98 Cassava 7.98 -
Tobacco 4.26 Tobacco 4.26 -33
Table 2: Description of variables
Variable Signification
Profits Household’s annual agricultural profits. The profits are composed of the
agricultural sales and of the value of crop autoconsumption.
HH size Number of people in the family outside the household’s head.
HH head age 2 Household’s heads’ age (squared age), in logs.
HH head schooling Household’s head’s last achieved school year. 1-6 : primary school: 7-13,
secondary school, 14-18: university.
Members age Household’s members’ average age.
Cropland size Number of squared meters of land the household crops or has in fallow,
in logsa
Owner Proportion of owned cropped land.
Tenant Proportion of rented cropped land.
Sharecropper Proportion of cropped land in sharecropping.
Outstanding loan Dummy indicating whether the household has a loan meant for agricul-
ture. 1=yes, 0=no.
Inputs Dummy indicating whether the household used inputs in its production.
1=yes, 0=no.
Price index lt Price index for long term crops, in logs.
Price index st Price index for short term crops, in logs.
SE. Price index lt Standard error of the price index for long term crops, in logs.
SE. Price index st Standard error of the price index for short term crops, in logs.
Temp. amplitude Temperature amplitude : range between the highest recorded tempera-
ture and the lowest one.
Disturbances Index indicating the risk of atmospheric disturbances. Goes from 0=low
risk to 5=high risk.
Transport cost Cost of transporting 50 kg of rice to the nearest town.
Farmers association Dummy indicating whether the village where the household lives has an
association of farmers. 1=yes, 0=no.
Share agri. Pop. Share of the population of the community in the agricultural sector.
Fertilizer use Share of the farmers of the community who use fertilizers. 0=0%, 1=¡5%,
2=5-25%,., 5=¿75%.
National road Dummy indicating if a national road runs throughout the community.
1=yes, 0=no.
Steer Number of steers in the community.
Important crop Dummy indicating if the household’s first or second crop corresponds
to the most important crop (in surface or in value) in the community.
1=yes, 0=no.
Number of rich Percentage of rich people in the community.
Number of poor Percentage of poor people in the community.b
Remoteness index Index indicating how remote the community is. This index takes into
account the infrastructure of the community and transport facilities.
For more details, see the Ilo census of the Cornell University. Goes from
1=least remote to 5 most remote.
Livestock Number of cows and pigs in the community.
Regional dummies Dummies for the 6 Faritanys (provinces). Each dummy equals to 1 if
the village is in this province and 0 otherwise.
Year dummies Dummies indicating to which EPM the household belong. 1=yes, 0=no.
aFor variables that have zero values, we added 1 to the variable so that the log is always feasible.
bNumber of rich and number of poor do not add to 1, since the data gives in addition the number of
middle-rich and of middle-poor.
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Table 3: Short term and long term crops
Short term crops
Time from
planting to
harvest
Long term crops
Time from
planting to
harvest
(Less than 18 months
from planting to
harvest)
Months
More than 18 months
from planting to
harvest
Years
Ananas 12 Apple 2-5
Banana 9-12 Avocado 4-10
Beans 2-3 Cloves 6-8
Beetroot 1 Cocoa beans 4-5
Brede (leaves) 2-6 Coconut 3-8
Cabbage 7-12 Coffee 3-4
Carrots 2-3 Litchi 3-5
Cassava 12 Mandarin 3-5
Cotton 18 Mango 3-5
Cucumber 2-3 Oranges 3-5
Garlic 8-12 Peaches 3-4
Leeks 8-12 Pepper 3-8
Lenses 6 Vanilla 4-7
Lettuce 3-4
Maize 3
Melon 6-12
Onions 1-3
Peanuts 4-5
Peas 2-3
Potato 3
Pumpkin 4-6
Rice 3-6
Soja 3
Sugar cane 18
Sweet potato 3-7
Taro 6-12
Tobacco 5-8
Tomatoes 2-3
Watermelon 6-12
Wheat 6
Yam 9-12
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Table 4: Switching regression results, λ = 0
lnprofit1 lnprofit0 occupation
HH size 0.07*** 0.04** -0.01
[14.15] [2.07] [0.85]
HH head age 0.672 4.76*** 1.66
[1.04] [2.69] [1.09]
HH head age 2 -0.08 -0.63*** -0.25
[0.94] [2.63] [1.19]
HH head schooling 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.02
[10.33] [3.79] [1.45]
Members age 0.14*** -0.02 0.05
[6.54] [0.93] [0.72]
Cropland size 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.13***
[11.29] [2.77] [3.24]
Outstanding loan 0.18*** 0.29*** 0.10
[2.99] [2.57] [0.46]
Inputs 0.17*** 0.07 0.8
[3.90] [0.80] [0.64]
Fertilizer use -1.54E-03 -0.02 0.04
[0.12] [0.88] [1.03]
Steer 4.89E-07 -3.42E-06 -6.04E-06*
[0.24] [1.13] [1.80]
Owner 0.02 -0.13 0.17
[0.50] [0.80] [1.44]
Sharecropper 0.01 -0.26 -0.13
[0.07] [1.07] [0.70]
Tenant 0.15* 0.29 -0.05
[1.93] [1.38] [0.22]
Temp. amplitude 0.01 0.01 -0.01
[1.19] [0.64] [0.46]
Disturbances 0.02 0.07 -0.15***
[0.61] [0.89] [2.69]
Transport cost 3.40E-07 -1.54E-06 -4.31E-06
[0.19] [0.46] [1.51]
National road 0.08* -0.01 0.04
[1.85] [0.14] [0.43]
Farmers association 0.07 -0.13 0.13
[1.49] [1.62] [1.21]
Share agri. pop. -1.72E-03* -2.08E-03 -3.89E-03
[1.65] [0.81] [1.50]
Important crop -4.09E-03 -0.05 -0.15
[0.12] [0.61] [1.61]
Year1993 -0.25*** -0.74** 0.56***
[3.32] [2.48] [2.86]
Year1997 0.33*** 0.19 -0.17
[5.61] [1.33] [1.19]
Year1999 0.33*** 0.21 -0.03
[5.49] [1.44] [0.16]
Faritany2 -0.20*** 0.06 0.10
[3.28] [0.49] [0.74]
Faritany3 -0.19** -0.48* 0.55***
[2.28] [1.73] [2.93]
Faritany4 -0.15 -0.31 0.65**
[1.26] [1.07] [2.23]
Faritany5 -0.23*** -0.38** 0.30
[2.62] [1.69] [1.46]
Faritany7 0.08 -0.15 0.38**
[1.04] [0.66] [2.03]
Number of poor -0.01***
[2.59]
Number of rich -0.01**
[2.14]
Remoteness index 0.09*
[1.81]
Livestock -1.65E-06
[0.11]
Price index 2.06***
[6.74]
SE Price index -0.04**
[2.19]
Constant 9.15*** 2.06 -2.47
[8.14] [0.62] [0.81]
Sigma1 0.62***
[26.49]
Sigma2 0.62***
[12.53]
rho1 0.53***
[3.62]
rho2 0.08
[0.13]
σˆλ 2.26E-04
Observations 5951
Wald chi2(28) 1171.50 Prob > chi2=0.000
Wald test of indep. eqns. : chi2(1) = -9.7E+06 Prob > chi2 = 1.0000
Robust z statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 5a: Switching regression results, λ = 0.1
lnprofit1 lnprofit0 occupation
HH size 0.06*** 0.05*** -0.01
[13.82] [3.59] [1.31]
HH head age 0.52 3.61** 0.90
[0.84] [2.36] [0.69]
HH head age 2 -0.06 -0.48** -0.15
[0.73] [2.33] [0.82]
HH head schooling 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.02*
[10.14] [4.46] [1.87]
Members age 0.14*** 0.07 0.06
[6.47] [0.97] [1.16]
Cropland size 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.10***
[11.31] [4.80] [2.93]
Outstanding loan 0.17** 0.19* 0.06
[2.53] [1.84] [0.35]
Inputs 0.20*** -0.02 0.07
[4.36] [0.29] [0.73]
Fertilizer use -5.46E-04 -0.02 0.07**
[0.04] [0.79] [2.24]
Steer 4.61E-07 -2.62E-06 -2.28E-06
[0.23] [0.91] [0.68]
Owner 0.02 -0.01 0.19**
[0.54] [0.12] [2.03]
Sharecropper 0.02 -0.30 -0.14
[0.29] [1.38] [0.78]
Tenant 0.16** 0.12 -0.04
[2.00] [0.72] [0.22]
Temp. amplitude 4.12E-03 0.03 -0.04
[0.40] [1.47] [1.53]
Disturbances 0.02 0.02 -0.11**
[0.55] [0.35] [2.02]
Transport cost 9.36E-08 -4.48E-07 -6.31E-06**
[0.06] [0.15] [2.30]
National road 0.07* -0.02 -2.44E-03
[1.73] [0.24] [0.03]
Farmers association 0.06 -0.02 0.03
[1.40] [0.28] [0.34]
Share agri. pop. -1.37E-03 -2.89E-03 -3.60E-03
[1.36] [1.29] [1.53]
Important crop -0.01 -0.01 -0.05
[0.29] [0.09] [0.68]
Year1993 -0.18** -0.64*** 0.10
[2.40] [4.26] [0.60]
Year1997 0.35*** 0.13 -0.20
[5.70] [1.17] [1.45]
Year1999 0.36*** 0.12 0.01
[5.67] [1.00] [0.05]
Faritany2 -0.19*** -0.01 0.14
[3.09] [0.08] [1.11]
Faritany3 -0.15* -0.27 0.48***
[1.87] [1.37] [2.82]
Faritany4 -0.07 -0.34 0.82***
[0.54] [1.44] [3.12]
Faritany5 -0.19** -0.36* 0.39**
[2.13] [1.92] [2.14]
Faritany7 0.08 0.11 0.44***
[1.09] [0.53] [2.70]
Number of poor -4.16E-03**
[2.21]
Number of rich -3.23E-03
[1.32]
Remoteness index 0.07
[1.56]
Livestock -1.18E-05
[0.96]
Price index 1.99***
[8.08]
SE Price index -0.03*
[1.74]
Constant 9.27*** 4.20 -1.15
[8.01] [1.46] [0.47]
Sigma1 0.61***
[22.79]
Sigma2 0.69***
[11.26]
rho1 0.51***
[3.54]
rho2 0.23
[0.82]
Observations 5823
Wald chi2(28) 1196.55 Prob > chi2=0.000
Wald test of indep. eqns. : chi2(1) = -1.0e+07 Prob > chi2 = 1.0000
Robust z statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 5b: Switching regression results, λ = 0.2
lnprofit1 lnprofit0 occupation
HH size 0.06*** 0.05*** -0.02*
[13.03] [4.82] [1.84]
HH head age -0.11 3.57*** 0.51
[0.17] [2.92] [0.42]
HH head age 2 0.02 -0.47*** -0.1
[0.26] [2.85] [0.61]
HH head schooling 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.02**
[9.42] [5.14] [2.37]
Members age 0.16*** 0.03 0.09*
[6.96] [0.62] [1.69]
Cropland size 0.19*** 0.23*** 0.07**
[10.58] [6.51] [2.33]
Outstanding loan 0.24*** 0.17** 0.15
[3.52] [2.03] [1.02]
Inputs 0.19*** 0.04 0.02
[3.98] [0.53] [0.20]
Fertilizer use 4.82E-03 -0.02 0.05*
[0.33] [1.01] [1.79]
Steer 3.14E-07 -1.14E-06 -1.42E-06
[0.16] [0.46] [0.46]
Owner -0.01 0.05 0.17*
[0.34] [0.57] [1.79]
Sharecropper 0.02 -0.17 -0.10
[0.27] [1.03] [0.53]
Tenant 0.15* 0.07 0.10
[1.95] [0.48] [0.59]
Temp. amplitude 3.85E-03 0.03* -0.04
[0.39] [1.85] [1.58]
Disturbances 0.03 0.02 -0.12**
[1.06] [0.54] [2.24]
Transport cost 7.65E-07 -1.47E-06 -5.94E-06**
[0.57] [0.62] [2.31]
National road 0.07* 0.01 -0.01
[1.70] [0.14] [0.15]
Farmers association 0.06 0.02 0.03
[1.39] [0.36] [0.34]
Share agri. pop. -1.23E-03 -2.43E-03 -4.09E-03**
[1.21] [1.45] [1.97]
Important crop 0.01 -0.06 -1.87E-03
[0.34] [1.19] [0.03]
Year1993 -0.08 -0.73*** 0.19
[1.07] [5.36] [1.19]
Year1997 0.35*** 0.21** -0.18
[5.49] [2.48] [1.39]
Year1999 0.34*** 0.24*** -0.08
[5.17] [2.81] [0.60]
Faritany2 -0.22*** -0.03 0.15
[3.39] [0.37] [1.13]
Faritany3 -0.19** -0.12 0.33**
[2.33] [0.88] [2.02]
Faritany4 -0.09 -0.27* 0.59**
[0.71] [1.79] [2.50]
Faritany5 -0.20** -0.32** 0.45**
[2.21] [2.31] [2.52]
Faritany7 0.08 0.03 0.53***
[1.04] [0.24] [3.24]
Number of poor -4.03E-03**
[2.16]
Number of rich -0.01***
[2.59]
Remoteness index 0.07*
[1.77]
Livestock -1.69E-05
[1.54]
Price index 1.90***
[7.48]
SE Price index -0.02
[1.20]
Constant 10.39*** 3.93* -0.41
[8.79] [1.73] [0.18]
Sigma1 0.59***
[19.22]
Sigma2 0.67***
[19.51]
rho1 0.41**
[2.28]
rho2 0.16
[0.92]
Observations 5599
Wald chi2(28) 1102.04 Prob > chi2=0.000
Wald test of indep. eqns. : chi2(1) = -1.1e+07 Prob > chi2 = 1.0000
Robust z statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 5c: Switching regression results, λ = 0.3
lnprofit1 lnprofit0 occupation
HH size 0.07*** 0.05*** -0.02**
[13.02] [5.98] [2.39]
HH head age 0.20 2.04* 0.47
[0.31] [1.94] [0.41]
HH head age 2 -0.02 -0.26* -0.10
[0.21] [1.84] [0.66]
HH head schooling 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.02***
[9.10] [5.76] [2.71]
Members age 0.17*** 0.05 0.13***
[6.78] [1.11] [2.71]
Cropland size 0.18*** 0.23*** 0.07**
[9.47] [8.13] [2.34]
Outstanding loan 0.26*** 0.10 0.22*
[4.67] [1.28] [1.66]
Inputs 0.19*** 0.07 0.02
[4.06] [1.24] [0.24]
Fertilizer use 8.83E-04 -0.01 0.05*
[0.06] [0.28] [1.72]
Steer -3.30E-07 3.42E-07 -9.16E-07
[0.16] [0.14] [0.31]
Owner -0.05 0.06 0.04
[1.22] [0.71] [0.42]
Sharecropper -0.01 -0.12 -0.09
[0.13] [0.89] [0.51]
Tenant 0.11 0.10 0.08
[1.41] [0.80] [0.47]
Temp. amplitude 0.01 0.01 -0.03
[0.57] [1.06] [1.46]
Disturbances 0.02 0.03 -0.17***
[0.89] [0.83] [3.32]
Transport cost 3.54E-07 -1.35E-07 -6.90E-06***
[0.25] [0.07] [2.68]
National road 0.06 0.02 -0.04
[1.61] [0.28] [0.44]
Farmers association 0.08* 0.02 0.07
[1.95] [0.31] [0.80]
Share agri. pop. -1.62E-03 -1.47E-03 -0.01***
[1.60] [0.85] [3.24]
Important crop -0.01 -0.03 -0.06
[0.29] [0.59] [0.87]
Year1993 -0.01 -0.68*** 0.28*
[0.09] [5.38] [1.80]
Year1997 0.36*** 0.25*** -0.18
[5.44] [3.27] [1.47]
Year1999 0.33*** 0.25*** -0.15
[4.79] [3.29] [1.20]
Faritany2 -0.24*** -0.06 0.12
[3.51] [0.86] [0.98]
Faritany3 -0.19** -0.12 0.42***
[2.40] [1.00] [2.70]
Faritany4 -0.07 -0.22 0.50**
[0.54] [1.57] [2.21]
Faritany5 -0.17* -0.32** 0.55***
[1.88] [2.46] [3.22]
Faritany7 0.07 0.09 0.67***
[0.87] [0.71] [4.41]
Number of poor -2.67E-03
[1.54]
Number of rich -0.01**
[2.40]
Remoteness index 0.05
[1.28]
Livestock -2.31E-05**
[2.04]
Price index 1.98***
[9.05]
SE Price index 2.78E-04
[0.02]
Constant 9.89*** 6.51*** -0.23
[8.14] [3.34] [0.11]
Sigma1 0.57***
[18.26]
Sigma2 0.65***
[22.41]
rho1 0.31
[1.55]
rho2 0.17
[1.15]
Observations 5372
Wald chi2(28) 1057.36 Prob > chi2=0.000
Wald test of indep. eqns. : chi2(1) = -1.1e+07 Prob > chi2 = 1.0000
Robust z statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 5d: Switching regression results with short term and long term prices,
λ = 0
lnprofit1 lnprofit0 occupation
HH size 0.07*** 0.04* -0.01
[14.24] [1.92] [0.62]
HH head age 0.68 3.71** 2.65*
[1.14] [2.03] [1.66]
HH head age 2 -0.08 -0.48* -0.38*
[1.03] [1.94] [1.77]
HH head schooling 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.02
[10.43] [3.70] [1.57]
Members age 0.14*** -0.03 0.04
[6.58] [0.28] [0.51]
Cropland size 0.18*** 0.20** 0.13***
[11.20] [2.20] [2.97]
Outstanding loan 0.18*** 0.38** 0.11
[2.99] [2.53] [0.55]
Inputs 0.17*** 0.03 0.10
[3.97] [0.27] [0.79]
Fertilizer use -1.78E-03 -0.02 0.05
[0.13] [0.72] [1.49]
Steer 4.66E-07 -1.40E-06 –5.44E-06*
[0.23] [0.44] [1.67]
Owner 0.02 -0.18 0.19
[0.40] [1.04] [1.62]
Sharecropper 0.01 -0.31 -0.06
[0.15] [1.26] [0.32]
Tenant 0.15* 0.31 -0.06
[1.92] [1.44] [0.27]
Temp. amplitude 0.01 0.02 -0.02
[1.19] [1.03] [0.52]
Disturbances 0.02 0.11 -0.17***
[0.69] [1.27] [2.95]
Transport cost 2.91E-07 -2.33E-06 -2.66E-06
[0.19] [0.69] [0.75]
National road 0.08** -0.04 0.01
[1.97] [0.52] [0.08]
Farmers association 0.06 -0.15* 0.16
[1.56] [1.87] [1.40]
Share agri. pop. -1.66E-03 -1.74E-03 -3.88E-03
[1.62] [0.64] [1.49]
Important crop -3.57E-03 -0.02 -0.20**
[0.11] [0.21] [2.07]
Year1993 -0.26*** -0.89** 0.72***
[3.51] [2.41] [3.44]
Year1997 0.33*** 0.14 -0.15
[5.72] [0.91] [0.99]
Year1999 0.34*** 0.11 0.03
[5.53] [0.74] [0.21]
Faritany2 -0.20*** 0.06 0.04
[3.36] [0.41] [0.30]
Faritany3 -0.19** -0.61** 0.48**
[2.38] [2.15] [2.49]
Faritany4 -0.15 -0.51 0.75**
[1.31] [1.53] [2.49]
Faritany5 -0.23*** -0.56** 0.27
[2.59] [2.42] [1.35]
Faritany7 0.07 -0.20 0.23
[0.97] [0.86] [1.05]
Number of poor -0.01***
[2.63]
Number of rich -0.01*
[1.94]
Remoteness index 0.08
[1.42]
Livestock 4.84E-06
[0.30]
Price index long term 8.38***
[4.11]
SE Price index long term -3.20***
[3.54]
Price index short term 0.52
[1.47]
SE Price index short term -0.06***
[2.84]
Constant 9.09*** 3.77 -4.10
[8.09] [1.11] [1.39]
Sigma1 0.61**
[26.17]
Sigma2 0.62***
[9.84]
rho1 0.43**
[2.32]
rho2 -0.09
[0.15]
Observations 5955
Wald chi2(28) 1193.52 Prob > chi2=0.000
Wald test of indep. eqns. : chi2(1) = -9.6e+06 Prob > chi2 = 1.0000
Robust z statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 5e: Switching regression results on rice subsample, λ = 0
lnprofit1 lnprofit0 occupation
HH size 0.06*** 0.04* -0.01
[12.62] [1.81] [0.81]
HH head age 0.46 4.53* 1.33
[0.70] [2.37] [0.81]
HH head age 2 -0.05 -0.60** -0.22
[0.59] [2.32] [1.00]
HH head schooling 0.03*** 0.04*** 1.27E-03
[9.73] [3.66] [0.12]
Members age 0.14*** 2.05E-03 0.06
[5.94] [0.02] [0.82]
Cropland size 0.21*** 0.21** 0.16***
[11.11] [2.57] [3.78]
Outstanding loan 0.17** 0.35** 0.13
[2.51] [2.35] [0.62]
Inputs 0.14*** 0.08 0.05
[3.30] [0.79] [0.39]
Fertilizer use 0.01 -0.03 0.02
[0.63] [1.05] [0.60]
Steer 7.53E-07 -2.77E-06 -2.27E-06
[0.37] [0.91] [0.63]
Owner 0.02 -0.12 0.25**
[0.41] [0.66] [2.03]
Sharecropper -0.03 -0.25 -0.06
[0.36] [1.02] [0.32]
Tenant 0.11 0.31 0.05
[1.42] [1.43] [0.20]
Temp. amplitude 0.02 0.02 0.02
[1.44] [0.62] [0.64]
Disturbances 0.01 0.03 -0.15***
[0.24] [0.34] [2.66]
Transport cost -4.15E-07 -3.14E-06 -5.76E-06***
[0.25] [0.85] [2.66]
National road 0.08* -0.04 0.05
[1.92] [0.42] [0.41]
Farmers association 0.03 -0.12 0.06
[0.81] [1.40] [0.52]
Share agri. pop. -2.57E-05** -1.65E-03 -3.87E-03
[2.37] [0.59] [1.40]
Important crop 0.02 -0.05 -0.12
[0.52] [0.54] [1.11]
Year1993 -0.33*** -0.77** 0.45**
[4.47] [2.30] [2.20]
Year1997 0.35*** 0.12 -0.21
[5.94] [1.19] [1.46]
Year1999 0.33*** 0.20 -0.09
[5.43] [1.26] [0.57]
Faritany2 -0.20*** 0.08 0.06
[3.38] [0.58] [0.45]
Faritany3 -0.16* -0.34 0.52***
[1.96] [1.11] [2.66]
Faritany4 -0.19* -0.21 0.37
[1.71] [0.73] [1.27]
Faritany5 -0.13 -0.24 0.31
[1.45] [0.92] [1.50]
Faritany7 0.09 -0.09 0.37*
[1.26] [0.34] [1.89]
Number of poor -0.01**
[2.54]
Number of rich -0.01**
[2.45]
Remoteness index 0.08
[1.56]
Livestock -1.23E-06
[0.08]
Price index 2.17***
[5.88]
SE Price index -0.05*
[1.86]
Constant 9.34*** 2.49 -2.05
[7.62] [0.70] [0.66]
Sigma1 0.61***
[24.93]
Sigma2 0.63***
9.61]
rho1 0.52***
[3.35]
rho2 0.13
[0.24]
Observations 4996
Wald chi2(29) 1153.65 Prob > chi2=0.000
Wald test of indep. eqns. : chi2(1)= -8.0e+06 Prob > chi2=1.000
Robust z statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 6: Conditional profits
Subsistence, Ii = 0 Market, Ii = 1 Opportunity cost Entry cost
Lower bound Marginal HH Upper bound
λ = 0
piMi 210399.5 551470.3
Se (3877.9) (7688.2)
piSi 387379.1 526704.5 167800.1 481496.9 536385.9 591274.9
Se (13999.8) (12818.9) (9543.9) (28004.6)
λ = 0.1
piMi 326586.0 563272.6
Se (4947.8) (7784.7)
piSi 427452.2 531248.9 133216.1 393341.8 429835.5 466329.2
Se (10988.6) (11332.1) (6345.4) (18619.2)
λ = 0.2
piMi 394503.4 571292.7
Se (6331.5) (7955.8)
piSi 489019.1 542381.9 103329.2 404515.2 433759.0 463002.8
Se (10196.8) (9393.6) (5084.8) (14920.3)
λ = 0.3
piMi 463059.6 580895.0
Se (7336.1) (8705.2)
piSi 513787.9 561932.1 96145.7 400168.3 426384.5 452600.7
Se (8424.9) (8894.3) (4558.4) (13375.6)
Table 6a: Conditional profits on rice subsample
Subsistence, Market, Opportunity cost Entry cost
Ii = 0 Ii = 1 Lower bound Marginal HH Upper bound
Rice, λ = 0
piMi 231262.7 561033.0
Se (4437.8) (8604.2)
piSi 391486.0 548657.1 181749.2 520575.5 580631.8 640688.1
Se (14083.4) (14345.4) (10442.5) (30641.0)
Rice,
λ = 0.1
piMi 427582.5 573416.8
Se (6743.8) (8628.9)
piSi 439159.1 575805.2 157048.6 477889.3 518329.4 558769.5
Se (10983.6) (12862.3) (7031.6) (20632.7)
Rice,
λ = 0.2
piMi 427658.8 581833.3
Se (7169.3) (8781.8)
piSi 503923.1 562510.2 114272.0 357045.9 390150.0 423254.1
Se (10576.6) (10554.4) (5756.1) (16889.8)
Rice,
λ = 0.3
piMi 502038.1 591717.1
Se (8374.7) (9437.7)
piSi 529234.2 581513.4 110794.7 391321.7 419105.6 446889.5
Se (9009.2) (10137.5) (4831.0) (14175.5)
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Table 7: Opportunity cost regressions
Subsistence farmers
Expenditure per capita -0.04
[1.13]
HH size 0.09***
[9.40]
HH head age -10.51***
[9.32]
HH head age 2 1.38***
[9.01]
HH head schooling -0.01*
[1.94]
Members age 0.51***
[10.54]
Cropland size -0.04**
[1.98]
Owner 0.72***
[7.52]
Sharecropper 1.02***
[7.58]
Tenant -0.71***
[3.37]
Outstanding loan -1.21***
[3.01]
Farmers association 0.81***
[14.14]
Share agri. pop. 0
[0.34]
Transport cost 0.00***
[3.72]
National road 0.37***
[5.91]
Year1993 1.49***
[10.00]
Year1997 0.47***
[4.25]
Year1999 0.41***
[4.42]
Faritany1 -0.31***
[3.50]
Faritany2 -1.42***
[9.62]
Faritany3 0.21**
[2.10]
Faritany4 -0.07
[0.42]
Faritany5 0.08
[0.83]
Constant 16.79***
[7.97]
Observations 371
R-squared 0.71
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Figure 1: Evolution of prices
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